Freedom from torture is regarded as "absolute", meaning that a state cannot infringe the right for purposes which would seem legitimate such as the protection of national security. Indeed, the freedom is viewed as "non-derogable"; that is, infringements are not permitted even in special circumstances such as times of war or public emergency.
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This piece is the first in a two article study assessing the prohibition on torture. Here the author analyses whether the freedom is in fact without limitation. If there is an argument suggesting that the right should not be categorised as absolute, then perhaps this could construct a justification for certain interrogative techniques against a detainee to reveal intelligence about a terror plot, which would otherwise be prohibited under domestic, European and international law. In a follow-up article it is hoped that a similar argument possibly legitimising the use of torture could be constructed, but on the basis of the "positive" nature of the right; that is, the obligation that the freedom imposes on state authorities to prevent breaches of the right by third parties such as terrorists could similarly be used to infringe the freedoms of detainees. There have been several discussions of the use of torture post 9/11 in academic circles of late. 16 But the author believes that the particular originality of this two article study, in questioning here the absolute nature of the right, is also to construct a later argument possibly justifying the use of ill-treatment against a terror suspect on the basis of the right's positive nature. It may be alarming to some individuals that this discussion by the author is even taking place since the prohibition on the use of ill-treatment has been a fundamental feature of the international community since at least 1948 with the creation of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR). In reply, the author notes the comments of Evans in an
Editorial for a special issue of the European Human Rights Law Review on torture in 2006 (though Evans would probably be horrified that this author is using him as a possible justification for reversing the absolute ban):
"[I]f torture were not a legitimate topic for debate, it would never have been prohibited in the first place and the fact of its being prohibited as a matter of international law cannot and should not preclude its discussion: on the contrary, it demands it. It is a lack of debate which would be more worrisome since this would threaten to condemn the prohibition to obscurity." 17 Indeed, with the recent revelations by the former American President, George W Bush, that techniques of ill-treatment such as "waterboarding" used against terror detainees in US custody in Cuba "saved [UK] lives", by averting attacks at, for example, Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf in London, 18 such a discussion about 4 the permissibility of ill-treatment against detainees is never perhaps more relevant than at any time since the rendering of suspects post 9/11.
Torture, other forms of ill-treatment and war crimes
Before discussing whether freedom from torture is indeed without limitation, it is important first to assess the right's significance, if at all. This will serve the purpose of making later assessments about the perceived limitless nature of the freedom easier (or harder?) to advance. Torture and other forms of ill-treatment have been a feature of history for centuries. The Romans adopted techniques of torture against their slaves; the catholic church did so against heretics during the Inquisition. In modern times methods of torture were adopted widely during the Second World War: by Germany, Italy and Japan amongst others.
As a reaction to the atrocities committed by nations during World War II, the UDHR was adopted without dissent by the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) in To those countries where the UK, for example, was barred from routinely deporting terror suspects, for fear that they would be tortured on their return, the government, after the July 7, 2005 terrorist attacks in London, said that it would seek "diplomatic assurances" from at least 10 countries in the Middle East and North Africa that deportees would not be tortured. 33 So far such "diplomatic assurances" (or "memoranda of understanding") have been agreed with, for example, Jordan, Algeria, Lebanon, Libya and Ethiopia. The general legality of "diplomatic assurances" was considered by the ECtHR in Saadi v. Italy. 34 Here a Tunisian was challenging his deportation from Italy on the basis that there was a real risk of a breach of Article 3 in the receiving country. The UK had intervened as an interested 3 rd party in the case, alleging that this prohibition on deportations, as held in Chahal, should be amended since, for example, Chahal had been decided before 9/11.
In ruling whether there had been a breach of Article 3, the UK government argued that the ECtHR should either balance the interests of the state with the interests of the deportee (which in fact was the minority judgement in Chahal) or adopt a higher standard of proof of the risk of torture in the receiving country. However, the ECtHR rejected these submissions, 35 thus upholding the principle of "non-refoulement" post 9/11. Significantly, although assurances, to the satisfaction of the court, were not The effect of this legislation is that the United Kingdom, for domestic purposes, has "universal jurisdiction" 44 to try any individual, whatever their nationality, for acts of torture committed anywhere in the world. 45 To this end, London's Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) was investigating MI5 intelligence officers for their alleged complicity in the overseas torture of Binyam Mohammed, a former British resident at Guantanamo Bay. 46 Indeed, the UK's overseas intelligence service, the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), is itself being currently investigated by the MPS for alleged complicity in torture. 47 Because of these suspicions, there have been several domestic and international calls, for example, from the UK's Equality and Human
Rights Commission (EHRC) 48 and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), 49 and Human Rights Watch 50 for an independent inquiry into Britain's alleged complicity in torture. With a change of UK government in May 2010, it has been announced that an inquiry chaired by a former senior judge, Sir Peter Gibson, will investigate the matter, but the terms of the investigation -it will not be a full public inquiry, for example -have concerned human rights organisations. in making an application for asylum, of the three applicants, was one day. Two of the claimants were forced to sleep rough and the third claimant was on the verge of doing so. All the applicants had suffered a deterioration in health. 55 Here the court had to consider the legality of an extradition request from the authorities in the United States.
The US had sought the extradition of the applicant to stand trial in Kansas City, Missouri, for two charges of murder in the first degree (one of the victims was a pregnant woman). The UK authorities had received assurances from the Americans that the applicant would not be given the death penalty if convicted. However, the Americans did say that if the applicant was convicted, he would receive a life sentence without the possibility of probation, parole or release.
In the first instance the House of Lords noted the ruling of the ECtHR in Kafkaris v. 62 That is, maybe torture should be redefined, reserving it for extreme forms of physical torment and excluding lesser forms of ill-treatment? 63 So psychological duress such as the so called "five techniques" used against republican detainees in Ireland (which were a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR but perhaps were not torture in the strict sense of Article 1 of the UNCAT) could be justifiable measures to encourage suspects to reveal intelligence (especially as they were successful in providing information in In this situation the individual to be harmed would be specified, as would the level and duration of the ill-treatment to be inflicted. Anything outside the warrant's specification would be a criminal offence. 66 Historically, England has a track record in issuing torture warrants for intelligence gathering (though this was only with executive rather than judicial approval). 67 Dershowitz justifies his position thus:
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"If American law enforcement officers were ever to confront the law school hypothetical case of the captured terrorist who knew about an imminent attack but refused to provide the information necessary to prevent it, I have absolutely no doubt that they would try to torture the terrorists into providing the information. Moreover, the vast majority of Americans would expect the officers to engage in that time-tested technique for loosening tongues, notwithstanding our unequivocal treaty obligation never to employ torture, no matter how exigent the circumstances. The real question is not whether torture would be used -it would -but whether it would be used outside of the law or within the law...It may sound absurd for a distinguished judge to be issuing a warrant to do something so awful. But consider the alternatives: either police would torture below the radar screen of accountability, or the judge who issued the warrant would be accountable. Which would be more consistent with democratic values?" 68 A second strategy, according to Evans, is to shift the responsibility for making the moral judgment whether or not to ill-treat a detainee from the judiciary to the individual. That is, torture would remain illegal so that anyone who honesty believed such an act to be necessary was placed in the position of needing to justify their act to defend themselves. 69 The current President of the UK's Supreme Court, Lord Phillips, has suggested that torture might be "forgiven" if it helped to find a ticking bomb.
Delivering a lecture on terrorism and human rights at the University of Hertfordshire when he was the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Phillips questioned whether torture could be used to induce a terrorist to disclose the location of a bomb that would otherwise take countless lives: "The classic answer is that the law can never justify the use of torture, but in a situation such as that the [individual] might be forgiven for acting in a manner that was unlawful." 70 This is an example where the use of torture against a detainee might be raised as an excuse, either as a defence or in mitigation, but the prohibition in law would still be maintained.
Is freedom from torture absolute? -a reply
Thus far, the author has assessed whether in fact freedom from torture can be categorised as unqualified. Assuming that it was not, this may justify the use of illtreatment against a detainee, such as the deprivation of food, it being an omission to act, rather than a positive infliction of harm by the state. In this section it is questioned whether indeed it is correct to assert that the right is not absolute. Before doing so, Here the earlier contention that the anti-torture right is not absolute is contradicted. In reference to the "spectrum" approach propounded by Laws LJ in the Court of Appeal in Limbuela, this was rejected by the House of Lords when the case came before that court. Lord Hope said that it had no foundation in anything of the judgments that had been delivered by the ECtHR, and it was hard to find a sound basis for it in the language of Article 3. 72 In more critical terms, the judge said: For the purposes of this article this judgment is seemingly unequivocal: Article 3 is indeed unqualified. So preventative torture techniques, such as the deprivation of sleep, "hooding" or "white noise", which would involve direct harm by the state, would clearly be illegitimate. Of greater significance perhaps, Lord Hope in Limbuela said that the real issue was whether the state was properly to be regarded as responsible for the harm. 74 So techniques of ill-treatment, such as the deprivation of food, which the author had suggested earlier might be permissible since they would be merely omissions to act rather than positive inflictions of harm, would still be outlawed as the state is still culpable for the ill-treatment that would ensue. On this issue more generally, Evans argues that one of the more unfortunate side-effects of the adoption of a definition of torture in Article 1 of the UNCAT is that it seems to have perpetuated the mistaken assumption that if a person is subjected to treatment falling short of torture ('torture lite'), then this can be legally acceptable. From an international lawyer's perspective, he says that this is "just nonsense". 75 Ambos further explains that while the UNCAT apparently distinguishes between torture and other forms of inhuman treatment, general human rights treaties such as the ICCPR treat torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment equally, they prohibit both. 76 So not only is psychological harm such as the deprivation of food illegal in domestic law as the state is still ostensibly to blame for the resulting torment, it is also not permitted internationally for the reason that all forms of illtreatment are unlawful.
Earlier the author also questioned how the right not to be tortured could be categorised as absolute if the criminal law permitted defences to charges of illtreatment? Simplistically, the prohibition on torture is a feature of human rights law, an element of civil law whose purpose is to compensate a victim, rather than criminal law whose purpose is to prosecute an offender. In more specific terms, Ambos largely dismisses self defence, which may be raised by an accused before, for example, the ICC pursuant to Article 31(1)(c) of the Rome Statute, as a successful defence in the "preventative" torture scenario. He argues that the degree of immediacy required for this defence is lacking. 77 That is, an agent of the state who has harmed a terror suspect with a view to averting an atrocity would need to show the imminent detonation of a bomb. Instances of this happening in practice are rare, if at all.
Moreover, Gaeta argues that necessity, which may be argued as a defence by an accused in similar international and domestic criminal proceedings, would also not apply to a "preventative" torture scenario. She says that it could never be used as a defence to torture as the torturer cannot be certain that their victim is in possession of the information they need, that they will give them the information they need, or that they will give them the correct information. 78 Thus, the torturer would rarely act, it at all, with sufficient justification to raise the defence because of the technique's inability in guaranteeing that it will be successful in averting an attack. This view of necessity seems to accord with its perception as a defence in domestic criminal law. If there is any criminal case a British law student is likely to remember it is Dudley v.
Stephens. 79 Here shipwrecked sailors, who were 1600 miles from land, had been eight days without food and six days without water. In desperation they killed the weakest of the survivors, the 17-year-old cabin boy, and fed on his body for four days before being rescued. They were not sentenced to death for murdering the boy so the court did accept, to some degree, their need to kill him. Nevertheless, the court's judgment actually implies that necessity was not available as a defence because when the sailors killed him, they had no way of establishing with much certainty that his death would save their lives. Indeed, it was only by chance that four days later they were found by a passing vessel. Necessity is often seen as opting for the "lesser of two evils". Yes, torturing a terror suspect is perhaps the "lesser of two evils", especially when compared with the potential loss of life and limb to innocent civilians. However, applying the Dudley case, the torturer cannot say with much conviction that before reverting to ill-treating a detainee, it will not only have the desired effect of providing intelligence, but also prevent an attack. These conclusions concerning the unavailability of the criminal defences of self defence and necessity would therefore 20 seem to support the absolute nature of the anti-torture right in human rights law, or at the very least in a preventative torture situation where they would arguably not apply.
Significantly, the limitless nature of freedom from ill-treatment has been reiterated recently by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR -Strasbourg's highest court -in Gaefgen v. Germany, 80 in circumstances where the use of torture would probably be condoned by the majority of people. Here Gaefgen had kidnapped an 11-year-old boy, the son of a senior bank executive. He then forwarded a letter to the boy's family in which he demanded one million Euros in return for the child's release. Three days after the boy's disappearance, Gaefgen was arrested by police after being observed picking up the ransom money. During his interrogation, the suspect was largely uncooperative so in order to save the child's life, the Frankfurt Police Vice-President ordered that pain be inflicted on Gaefgen under medical supervision. Accordingly, a subordinate officer warned the suspect that the police were prepared to inflict pain on him if he continued to withhold information concerning the boy's whereabouts. Under the influence of this threat, Gaefgen told the police the child's location (though regrettably when they found him, they discovered that he had already been murdered).
The ECtHR said:
"The Court accepts the motivation for the police officers' conduct and that they acted in an attempt to save a child's life. However, it is necessary to underline that...the prohibition on ill-treatment of a person applies irrespective of the conduct of the victim or the motivation of the authorities. Torture, inhuman or degrading treatment cannot be inflicted even in circumstances where the life of an individual is at risk...Article 3, which has been framed in unambiguous terms, recognises that every human being has an absolute, inalienable right not to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment under any circumstances, even the most difficult." 81 Thus, freedom from torture is categorically described -again -as being absolute.
Although only the threat of ill-treatment was made by the authorities in Gaefgen, Assuming that ill-treatment was not absolute, the author set a limit to the degree of torture to be used against a suspect, which was psychological duress. Indeed, he also questioned whether the deprivation of food might be more permissible, it being an omission to act, rather than positive actions by the state such as the deprivation of sleep, "hooding" and "white noise". Acts of ill-treatment might also be accorded greater credence if they were authorised by an independent judiciary.
Later, the author questioned whether the freedom was in fact qualified, however. The
House of Lords in Limbuela has categorically said that it is absolute when the state causes the harm, and in circumstances when it has not done so but is still to blame.
Furthermore, although the criminal law does afford defences to those individuals charged with acts of torture, such as duress and necessity, they arguably do not apply to the "ticking bomb" scenario. So the nature of the right is still without limitation, or at the very least for the purposes of this article where the author wishes to legitimise its infringement on the basis of preventing the immediate detonation of a terrorist bomb. Indeed, whilst Article 17 of the ECHR might support a qualification on the anti-torture right of terror detainees in theory, its actual application is limited, as per the ruling of the ECtHR in Lawless.
In conclusion, therefore, it has not been possible to justify the use of torture on the basis that freedom from ill-treatment, at least in the "ticking bomb" scenario, is qualified. Nevertheless, the situation of the "ticking bomb" is a debate that the author has on a regular basis with his students studying modules in Human Rights and
Terrorism. Many of them believe that freedom from torture should not be absolute. To this end, the author will explore in a subsequent article another case for a relaxation of the ban on torture but from a different perspective from that which was pursued here.
That is, he will attempt to legitimise the use of ill-treatment against a detainee on the basis of the "positive" obligation imposed on states to protect individuals from harm. Adopting this reasoning, the fact that children in particular were murdered and injured on 9/11, does this justify infringements of Article 3 against terror suspects? Perhaps there is a legitimate argument permitting torture, ironically on the basis of protecting the Article 3 rights of, say, terror victims, especially children? This therefore will be the focus of further study. Of course, the kidnap and subsequent murder of an 11 year old boy in Gaefgen did not justify the use of ill-treatment against a suspect but this case will be distinguished in the follow-up article. There the author will be examining the "positive" nature of the anti-torture right, as a basis for justifying ill-treatment, rather than the right in its "negative" sense, requiring states to desist from harming their citizens, which was the topic of analysis here. He suspects that this will be a more convincing argument for possibly legitimising ill-treatment against a detainee.
In this regard, therefore, inevitable questions that would follow from a relaxation of the torture ban (other than what would legitimate acts of ill-treatment entail, which were discussed in this article) will be reserved for later examination. These could include: is torture in fact a reliable means of evidence to avert a terrorist atrocity since a suspect is likely to say anything to a torturer to make the ill-treatment cease? To this end, Article 15 of the UNCAT states that any statement made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings (except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made). Also, once acts of torture were condoned to prevent acts of terror, might their use be extended to other areas of the criminal law such as kidnappings, especially where children were the victims, as in
Gaefgen?
